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INVESTIGATING THE EFFECT OF PARTICIPATION-LIMITING 
STRUCTURES ON OUTCOMES OF E-DEMOCRACY SYSTEMS  
(Research in Progress) 
 
Rajeev Sharma, School of Information Systems and Technology, University of Wollongong, 
Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia. rajeev@uow.edu.au 
Abstract 
Modern information systems provide a technical foundation for greater participation of citizens in the 
agenda-setting and decision-making processes of government. Information systems researchers and 
designers will need to address a number of issues to design IS applications for the effective 
functioning of evolving forms of democracy. This paper identifies a research agenda at the 
intersection of information systems research, economics and political science research and avenues 
for information systems researchers to contribute to the research agenda. 
Keywords: e-democracy, social choice theory, discourse theory, citizen welfare, decision-making. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The capabilities of modern information systems (IS) to support communication, coordination and 
decision-making involving multiple participants have led many scholars to speculate on the impact of 
IS on government. Many scholars have long speculated on the possibility of employing IS to transform 
the functioning and governance of democratic governments in ways that transform the relationship 
between citizen and state (Behrouzi 2005; Macpherson 1977; Päivärinta and Sæbø 2006). In 
particular, the capabilities of modern IS enable a much higher level of citizen participation in the 
agenda-setting and decision-making processes of government than are evident in even the most liberal 
democracies. The normative expectation is that e-democracies enable a mechanism for aggregating 
citizen preferences in ways that more legitimately reflect the collective will of the citizens and will 
lead to better outcomes for citizens and improve social welfare (Arrow 1951; Sen 1999). 
A key issue in the design of IS for e-democracy is the design of participation-limiting structures. 
While IS provide the capabilities to introduce high levels of citizen participation (Habermas 1999), 
pragmatic considerations suggest the need for limits to participation in the interest of achieving closure 
on decisions. For instance, structures that limit discussion on an issue to a certain time frame, or 
mandate voting on an issue on a certain date are examples of participation-limiting structures. 
Representative democracy is an example of a participation-limiting structure which limits participation 
by limiting the number of participants. 
However, different participation-limiting structures are likely to have different impacts on social 
welfare. An important issue for both IS researchers and practitioners is the identification and design of 
participation-limiting structures that will be built into IS for implementing e-democracies. This is an 
important issue as the success of e-democracy will depend on the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
participation-limiting structures. This paper identifies a research agenda for e-democracy research that 
is at the intersection of IS, economics and political science research. Drawing on social choice theory, 
discourse theory, theories of democracy and IS research, this research-in-progress paper first identifies 
research questions that contribute to the research on e-democracy. It then presents a research design to 
empirically investigate those issues. 
2 E-DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
This paper defines e-democracy
1
 as a form of government in which the capabilities of modern IS are 
employed to support citizen participation in the agenda-setting and decision-making processes of 
government. Many such initiatives are under way around the globe. For instance, the U.S. Government 
runs a website that aims to improve citizen “access to and participation in the federal regulatory 
process” (www.Regulations.gov, accessed December 6, 2010). The website enables “citizens to 
search, view and comment on regulations issued by the U.S. government,” thus eliminating the need 
for citizens to “have to visit a government reading room to provide comments …  Today using 
Regulations.gov, the public can shape rules and regulations that impact their lives conveniently, from 
anywhere.” As of December 6, 2010, the website had received over 400,000 public submissions. 
Similarly, the Government of Singapore has a website whose objectives include “Gathering and 
Gauging Ground Sentiments”, “Reaching Out and Engaging Citizens”, “Promoting Active Citizenry 
                                            
1 We distinguish e-democracy research from a related stream of research that goes under the label of e-government research. 
While we define e-democracy research as being concerned with the transformation of the relationship between citizen and 
state, e-government research is concerned with “the adoption of information and communication technology (ICT) in 
government organisations to improve public services” (http://project.hkkk.fi/ecis2011/track_evolution_EGovernment.htm, 
accessed December 7, 2010). 
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through Citizen Participation and Involvement” and, to “encourage and promote public participation in 
shaping government policies” (http://www.reach.gov.sg, accessed December 6, 2010). Similar 
initiatives to increase citizen participation in and control over government have been reported in Israel, 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Brazil and India (Chua et al. 2007; Fung 2003; Päivärinta and Sæbø 
2008). E-democracy initiatives are being reported at local, district, state and national levels of 
government, and also in other collectives such as workers unions, student unions, political parties and 
virtual communities (Dai and Norton 2008; Hercheui 2009; Kang and Dyson 2007). 
While these initiatives are still in their infancy and touch only peripherally on changing the 
relationship between citizen and state, they do suggest more IS-enabled initiatives in the future for 
citizens to participate in governance. The current initiatives primarily use IS as another channel to 
supplement communication between citizens, elected representatives and governments, creating a 
public sphere for deliberation (Habermas 1984; Habermas 1999). However, given continuing activist 
pressure for more citizen participation in governance, coupled with governments‟ search for 
legitimacy, future initiatives are likely to devolve more control to citizens. For instance, the 
government of the Canadian province of British Columbia created a citizens‟ assembly of 160 near-
randomly chosen citizens to deliberate on and design a proposal for electoral reform which was put to 
referendum in 2005 (Warren and Pearse 2008). Such agenda-setting and decision-making initiatives 
underscore the importance of the role IS would play in the future as governments respond to citizen 
demands for greater IS-enabled participation. 
In contrast, the dominant model of democracy, found in the USA, Australia and Western European 
democracies, among others, is representative democracy. This form of democracy is characterized by 
election of officials by citizens to run the government, government control over the agenda and only 
implicit participation by citizens in the decision-making process (Hirst 1990; Päivärinta and Sæbø 
2006). In this model, decisions are taken by elected representatives of the citizens and, once 
representatives have been elected, citizens lose direct control over decisions. Citizens retain some 
influence, but not control, over the agenda and the decision-making process through the forum of 
robust public debate.  The assumption underpinning this model is that, through the election process 
and the periodic election and re-election of representatives, the elected representatives represent the 
will of the people and that robust public debate ensures citizen influence over government, and 
protects citizens against the tyranny of the state (Sartori 1987; Sen 1999). 
The representative democracy model is viewed by many scholars as a practical compromise for 
implementing an idealized form of democracy characterized by direct citizen control over the agenda 
and an explicit role for citizens in the decision-making process (Päivärinta and Sæbø 2006). This 
model is closely identified with idealized descriptions of democracy in Greek city-states where 
agenda-setting and decision-making were carried out publicly and collectively by citizens (van Mill 
2006). This idealized model of democracy is referred by many scholars as the direct democracy 
model, and is characterized by citizens directly running the government (Warren and Pearse 2008). 
However, direct democracy becomes infeasible when the number of participants increases. The 
processes involving large number of citizens to negotiate and agree on an agenda and decisions can 
become so complex and time consuming that the process of governance comes to a standstill. Any 
benefits of the democratic form of governance over alternatives are far outweighed by the collective 
paralysis of decision-making that could occur in such a situation. Representative democracy is one 
solution to this problem. It overcomes the production bottleneck problem by limiting the participation 
of citizens but still preserves citizen influence on agenda and decision-making, though indirectly. 
3 E-DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION-LIMITING 
STRUCTURES 
There is a widespread belief that the realization of democratic ideals has been thwarted by the 
limitations of representative democracy (Baskoy 2009; Behrouzi 2005; Dai and Norton 2008; 
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Hercheui 2009; Insua 2008). In particular, the participation-limiting structures characterizing the 
representative democracy model have some inherent limitations that have led to expected undesirable 
outcomes. These include the rise of party politics, ideological rigidity of political parties, political 
corruption, and the power of special interest groups to thwart the will of citizens (Hirst 1990; 
Macpherson 1977). This has led to a general disaffection of citizens with politicians, political parties 
and the political process, declining levels of citizen engagement, and questionable legitimacy of 
democratic governments (Hirst 1990; van Mill 2006; Warren and Pearse 2008). 
The normative expectation is that e-democracy would lead to better social and individual outcomes 
and enable the realization of democratic ideals (Behrouzi 2005; Locke 1690/2005). This is on account 
of the much less restrictive participation-limiting structures that can be enacted in e-democracy as 
compared to representative democracies. However, participation-limiting structures are a part of e-
democracy too. While some such structures could be a consequence of the design of the IS artifacts 
underpinning e-democracy systems, it is possible that some such structures could emerge too as a 
consequence of the broader social context within which e-democracy is enacted. An understanding of 
the emergence and effects of participation-limiting structures on social choice and citizen welfare are 
important issues in the design and successful implementation of IS for e-democracy. 
Hercheui‟s (2009) research is an excellent illustration of the effect of decision-making and 
participation-limitation structures on the legitimacy and transparency of community decisions, and on 
the welfare of and outcomes of e-democratic processes for citizens. Hercheui studied democratic 
debates in virtual communities and examined the emergence and effects of participation-limiting 
structures in an e-democracy setting: “These communities present themselves as informal collectives 
… which have the aim of discussing environmental education mainly through discussion lists, and of 
mobilizing political efforts to influence the government and private organizations in their policies 
related to the theme” (p. 3). Hercheui conducted in-depth interviews with 58 members belonging to 
four virtual communities and transcribed and analysed the interview data to uncover factors “fostering 
and constraining democratic debate” between members (p. 5). Discussions and debates between 
members were primarily conducted through the internet, as would be done in an e-democracy. 
Hercheui‟s analysis highlights that within these supposedly democratic communities fostering freedom 
of speech, participation-limiting structures emerged to constrain and compromise democratic debate in 
many ways. For instance, members with minority opinion and those whose opinions diverged from 
those of the leaderships of the group were suppressed, publicly shamed and even expelled from the 
group; private interests of powerful social actors shaped the debate and activities of the group; and 
rewards (sanctions) to participants who expressed views aligned with (opposed to) those of powerful 
social actors. Hercheui observes that while the objective of the communities is to democratise the 
debate, “community members feel constrained in these very same virtual spaces as they understand 
they do not have freedom of opinion, especially in situations in which they would like to criticize the 
mainstream ideas and oppose the interests of powerful social actors” (p. 8). Hercheui concludes that 
even within these communities dedicated to fostering democratic debate, the space for pure democratic 
debate is limited: “on the one hand the communities appear as spaces for the democratization of the 
discussion … and on the other hand members constrain their opinions, respecting established 
structures of authority and fearing the surveillance of more powerful members” (p. 3). 
Hercheui‟s study serves to highlight the role of democratic processes themselves as an important area 
for future research. The design of IS for e-democracy needs to be shaped by our understanding of the 
effect of democratic processes on the outcomes that the state is expected to deliver for citizens. We 
develop below an agenda for IS researchers to investigate these issues. 
3.1 Democratic Processes, Welfare and Citizen Outcomes 
Democracy is one solution to the problem of aggregating the preferences of multiple participants in 
deciding on collective actions (Arrow 1951). The literature on social choice theory identifies multiple 
social mechanisms for aggregating preferences (Arrow 1951; Schofield 2002). Those social 
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mechanisms underpin multiple forms of democracy which deliver varying levels of democratic values. 
For instance, the voting rule commonly employed in a direct democracy is one-person one-vote and 
the option favored by the majority is accepted as the collective decision. Representative democracy 
has a more complex version of the same rule. However, as observed by Arrow (1951) in his 
impossibility theorem, all voting rules are in conflict with some basic democratic norm, such as non-
imposition and non-dictatorship. While democracy has been argued to be better than other alternatives 
(Sen 1999), it is arguable if one version of democracy is better than others. It might be difficult for 
proponents of direct democracy to make a case that a direct democracy is more democratic than a 
representative democracy. Rousseau (1762/2005) makes such a case arguing that an individual should 
not have to subjugate him/herself to the state, as is required in a representative democracy. 
There is also an inherent conflict between the democratic process and the rationality of outcomes. 
Discourse theorists offer one perspective on the democratic process, focusing on the legitimacy of 
collective decisions and actions. They argue that a democratic process ensuring long, equal and open 
collective deliberation would deliver consensual and legitimate outcomes (Habermas 1999; van Mill 
2006). In contrast, social choice theorists argue that a democratic process produces outcomes that are 
irrational and unstable (van Mill 2006). Attempts to resolve this conflict suggest that procedures that 
limit participation and impose justifiable limits on freedom can produce stable and rational social 
outcomes (Hercheui 2009; van Mill 2006). Representative democracy too can be viewed as a 
participation-limiting structure that improves the efficiency of the collective decision-making process. 
However, neither discourse theory, nor social choice theory, nor their apparent resolutions have been 
the subject of rigorous empirical examination (van Mill 2006). In the e-democratization process, such 
questions will need to be resolved in the design and development of IS artifacts underpinning e-
democracy. This presents a new agenda for IS researchers: 
Research Agenda: To investigate the effects of alternative IS-enabled decision-making 
and participation-limiting structures on the legitimacy, stability and 
rationality of collective decisions. 
Specifically, we identify the following questions for future research: 
RQ1: How do different decision-making and participation-limiting structures embedded 
within the IS artifact influence the efficiency of the collective decision-making 
process? 
RQ2: How do different decision-making and participation-limiting structures embedded 
within the IS artifact influence the rationality and legitimacy of outcomes? 
RQ3: How can structures embedded within the IS artifact aid in effectively discovering 
the impact of decision-making and participation-limiting structures on the 
efficiency, legitimacy and rationality of outcomes and make them transparent to 
citizens? 
RQ4: How can structures embedded within the IS artifact aid in effectively changing 
existing decision-making and participation-limiting structures to improve the 
outcomes of decision-making processes? 
RQ5: How do different decision-making and participation-limiting structures embedded 
within the IS artifact influence the political identities and social preferences of 
citizens? 
3.2 Principal-agent Problem and Citizen Welfare 
An almost impossible problem with representative democracies is how to resolve the conflict between 
the interests of the citizens and their representatives. Representative democracy is subject to the 
agency problem (Eisenhardt 1985). Elected representatives are agents of the people but the interests of 
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the elected representatives and the people they represent are not aligned. At times, they may even be 
opposed. This can give rise to opportunistic behaviors on the part of elected representatives. There are 
ample examples in the popular press of elected representatives not acting in the interests of the people 
they represent but in their own interests, for instance frequent reports of political corruption. 
However, even though in an e-democracy there are no principals to represent the will of the people in 
the decision-making process, there is the possibility that decision-making and participation-limiting 
structures could offer mechanisms for influencing outcomes and generating decisions that do not 
represent the will of the participants. We offer the following question for future research: 
RQ6: How do different decision-making and participation-limiting structures embedded 
within the IS artifact address the principal-agent problem? 
In addition to democratic values, democratic governments are also more likely to deliver positive 
social benefits as compared to autocratic alternatives (Locke 1690/2005). In addition to the 
emancipatory outcomes expected of democracies, states are also expected to deliver certain social 
outcomes and „common goods‟, such as economic prosperity, individual rights, property rights, law 
and order and national security (Locke 1690/2005; Rousseau 1762/2005; Sartori 1987). While there 
has been considerable discussion in the literature on fair voting schemes and closer proximity of e-
democracy to the democratic ideal (Behrouzi 2005), there has been less discussion on the outcomes for 
citizens and nations. Will an e-democracy deliver, for instance, greater economic prosperity, less 
crime, more egalitarian income distribution, and greater national security?  
RQ7: How do different decision-making and participation-limiting structures embedded 
within the IS artifact contribute to citizen welfare? 
4 CONDUCTING E-DEMOCRACY RESEARCH 
While it is difficult to imagine a full-scale implementation of e-democracy within which the above 
research questions can be investigated, many decision-making processes at different levels of 
government can be investigated to address the above questions. In particular, many local governments 
have decision-making processes that require citizen input as part of the decision-making process. As 
an example, local governments often invite comments from interested citizens on development 
applications before they can be considered for approval. However, the decision-making and 
participation-limiting structures exhibit wide variation across local governments. The level and 
influence of citizen involvement and control over the process vary across local governments. Further, 
citizen welfare in terms of economic growth, property prices, rents and public services also varies.  
Such variations offer an interesting avenue for researching the above questions and informing the 
design of IS for e-democracy. In addition, future research could also investigate the effect of IS 
artifacts, such as negotiation support systems, on the outcomes from participative decision-making 
processes.  This research intends to address the e-democracy research agenda by investigating the 
effect of different decision-making and participation-limiting structures in local governments and 
other settings on the legitimacy, stability and rationality of collective decisions. 
5 CONCLUSION 
E-democracy is an important emerging phenomenon that has the potential to transform both 
government and society. However, a number of issues need to be addressed to effectively inform the 
development and implementation of e-democracy. This research-in-progress paper has identified a 
research agenda for e-democracy research that is at the interface between economic, political science 
and IS research. It has also identified a potential research design for investigating this research agenda.  
Such research will contribute to shaping the future of government and society. IS researchers are well 
positioned to extend their existing research traditions to contribute to e-democracy research. 
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